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Chapter 1The State
Establishes Fiji's constitutional identity, sovereignty, foundational values, secular character and citizenship framework. Sections 1–5.
"The Republic of Fiji is a sovereign democratic State founded on the values of — common and equal citizenry and national unity; respect for human rights, freedom and the rule of law; an independent, impartial, competent and accessible system of justice; equality for all and care for the less fortunate; human dignity, respect for the individual, and respect for all cultures."
FPR Analysis
Section 1 establishes Fiji as a sovereign democratic state and sets out the foundational values against which all other provisions must be read. These values — rule of law, equality, human dignity — create interpretive obligations for courts, the government and the Constitutional Review Commission itself. The tension between s.1's rule of law commitment and the immunity provisions of Chapter 10 is the Constitution's most fundamental contradiction. A constitution that declares itself founded on the rule of law while permanently shielding those who overthrew a democratic government cannot fully honour that declaration.
SovereigntyDemocracyFoundational valuesRule of law
"This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Fiji. Any law inconsistent with this Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency."
FPR Analysis
Section 2 declares constitutional supremacy but its practical force is directly contradicted by Chapter 10, which permanently immunises from legal challenge all acts committed between December 2006 and the first sitting of Parliament after the 2013 Constitution commenced. No constitution can fully claim supremacy while embedding permanent protection for those who abolished its predecessor. The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of 29 August 2025 reinforced s.2 by clarifying that constitutional amendment — not military action — is the only legitimate mechanism for constitutional change. However, the Court could not resolve the s.2/Chapter 10 contradiction, because Chapter 10 is unamendable.
Constitutional supremacyRule of lawImmunity contradiction
CRC Watch
The Commission must directly address the incompatibility between s.2's supremacy claim and Chapter 10's unamendable immunity provisions. It cannot recommend amendment of Chapter 10. It must therefore be transparent about whether it is recommending reform of the existing Constitution or a new constitutional document."Religious belief is personal. Religion and the State are separate, which means — the State and all persons holding public office must treat all religions equally; the State must not dictate any religious belief; and no person shall assert any religious belief as a legal reason to disregard this Constitution or any other law."
FPR Analysis
Section 4 establishes Fiji as a secular state — a deliberate departure from post-1987 proposals to establish Christianity as a state religion. The provision recognises Fiji's religious diversity, including its significant Hindu and Muslim communities. The GCC proposals to remove sexual orientation and gender identity from the equality provisions in s.26 are partly grounded in religious argument. Section 4's final clause — that no person may use religious belief as a reason to disregard the Constitution — is directly relevant to that debate. The Commission must consider whether recommended amendments can be grounded in religious argument without violating s.4's separation principle.
Secular stateReligious equalitySeparation of religion and state
"All citizens of Fiji shall be known as Fijians. All Fijians have equal status and identity, which means that they are equally entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship, and subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Citizenship of Fiji shall only be acquired by birth, registration or naturalisation."
FPR Analysis
Section 5 is one of the 2013 Constitution's most significant departures from earlier constitutional arrangements — establishing a single civic identity of "Fijian" for all citizens regardless of ethnic background. Earlier constitutions used ethnically differentiated citizenship categories. The single civic identity underpins the non-communal electoral roll in Chapter 3 and the equality provisions in s.26. The naming debate has a constitutional history: under the 1997 Constitution all citizens were called "Fiji Islanders." The Bainimarama regime replaced this with "Fijian" by military decree in 2011, before the 2013 Constitution formally adopted the term. The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of August 2025 confirmed the 2013 Constitution as valid law, meaning "Fijian" is the current legal designation for all citizens until and unless Parliament and a referendum change it.
Civic identityNon-communalEqual citizenshipSingle rollGCC proposalNaming debate
CRC Watch
The Great Council of Chiefs has submitted to the CRC that the term "Fijian" should be reserved exclusively for iTaukei people, and that other citizens should be designated by their ethnic or community identity — Indo-Fijian, Rotuman, Banaban, and so on. The Soqosoqo Vakamarama ni iTaukei has formally endorsed the GCC's position. This proposal directly challenges s.5(1). Any amendment would require the two-thirds parliamentary supermajority and simple majority referendum threshold confirmed by the Supreme Court's advisory opinion ([2025] FJSC 20; Miscellaneous 1 of 2025). Prime Minister Rabuka and former Deputy PM Biman Prasad have both publicly opposed the GCC's position, arguing a single civic identifier promotes national unity. The Commission must address this question directly — it is one of the most politically charged before it.Chapter 2Bill of Rights
Fiji's Bill of Rights runs from s.6 (Application) to s.45 (Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission) and is among the most comprehensive in the Pacific — covering civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Several provisions are contested before the CRC.
"Every person has the right to life, and a person must not be arbitrarily deprived of life."
FPR Analysis
Section 8 establishes the right to life. Fiji abolished the death penalty in 1999. The right to life is one of the non-derogable rights under s.43 — it cannot be limited even under a declared state of emergency. Its practical force depends on the accountability mechanisms that give it substance. The immunity provisions in Chapter 10 bar any court challenge to acts — including any alleged deprivations of life — committed between December 2006 and the first sitting of Parliament after the 2013 Constitution commenced. This is the most serious practical consequence of Chapter 10 for the Bill of Rights.
Right to lifeNon-derogableDeath penalty abolished
"A person must not be deprived of personal liberty except — for the purpose of executing the sentence or order of a court; if the person is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence; for the purpose of the person's care or treatment or protection of the community; or for the purpose of preventing unlawful entry or effecting lawful removal from Fiji."
FPR Analysis
Section 9 protects personal liberty against arbitrary detention. It sets out the specific grounds on which detention is lawful and contains procedural protections including the right to be brought before a court within 48 hours of arrest. The provision is formally stable. As with s.8, the immunity provisions of Chapter 10 bar any court challenge to detentions occurring during the 2006-2013 period — a seven-year accountability gap that the CRC must address, at minimum by recommending the Human Rights Commission be empowered to receive and investigate complaints from that period for truth-finding purposes.
Personal libertyArbitrary detention48-hour rule
"Every person has the right to freedom from torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, and from cruel, inhumane, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. Every person has the right to security of the person, which includes the right to be free from any form of violence from any source, at home, school, work or in any other place."
FPR Analysis
Section 11 prohibits torture and cruel treatment in absolute terms — one of the non-derogable rights under s.43 that cannot be limited even under a state of emergency. Fiji is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture. Notably, s.11 also protects every person's right to security and freedom from violence at home, school and work — a provision with direct relevance to domestic violence law. As with ss.8 and 9, the immunity provisions of Chapter 10 bar court challenges to any alleged violations of s.11 during the 2006-2013 period.
Freedom from tortureAbsolute rightNon-derogableSecurity of person
"Every person has the right to freedom of speech, expression, thought, opinion and publication, which includes — freedom to seek, receive and impart information, knowledge and ideas; freedom of the press, including print, electronic and other media; freedom of imagination and creativity; and academic freedom and freedom of scientific research."
FPR Analysis
Section 17 provides comprehensive expression protections. However, s.17(3) permits Parliament to limit these rights for a broad range of purposes including national security, public order, public morality, and specifically "making provisions for the enforcement of media standards and providing for the regulation, registration and conduct of media organisations." This last ground has been used to enable regulatory frameworks that critics argue have suppressed rather than regulated media expression. The National Referendum Bill 2025, which restricts communication about constitutional amendments during referendum campaigns, must be assessed against whether its restrictions are proportionate to any legitimate aim under this provision.
Press freedomAcademic freedomMedia regulationReferendum Bill
CRC Watch
The Commission should consider whether the s.17(3)(h) media regulation ground needs to be better defined to prevent it from being used to restrict editorial independence beyond what is justifiable in a democratic society."Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection, treatment and benefit of the law. A person must not be unfairly discriminated against directly or indirectly on the basis of their — race, culture, ethnic or social origin, colour; sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression; disability, age or religion."
FPR Analysis
Section 26 is among the most progressive equality provisions in any Pacific constitution. No other Pacific Island state constitution explicitly protects sexual orientation and gender identity. The Great Council of Chiefs has submitted proposals to the CRC to remove gender and sexual orientation from the protected grounds. If accepted, Fiji would become the first Pacific nation to constitutionally roll back these protections — with significant implications for Fiji's international human rights obligations, its relationships with development partners, and the principle of equal citizenship in s.5. Any amendment requires a three-quarters parliamentary supermajority and referendum approval. The Commission's handling of this submission will define its legacy in the region.
EqualityNon-discriminationLGBTQ+ rightsGCC proposal
CRC Watch
The GCC has submitted to remove "gender" and "sexual orientation" from s.26(3). The Soqosoqo akamarama ni iTaukei has endorsed the GCC's broader submission on he naming of citizens under s.5 - a proposal that also raises direct tension with s.26's equality guarantee. Designating citizens by ethnic identity in the Constitution itself could be challenged as inconsistent with the equality framework unless s.26 is simultaneously amended. The Commission cannot address either proposal in isolation — any amendment to the naming provisions interacts directly with the equality framework. The Commission must be transparent about the legal standard it is applying and must engage with Fiji's international human rights obligations before making any recommendation on s.26(3)."The ownership of all iTaukei land shall remain with the customary owners of that land and iTaukei land shall not be permanently alienated, whether by sale, grant, transfer or exchange, except to the State in accordance with section 27."
FPR Analysis
Section 28 protects customary land ownership for iTaukei (s.28(1)-(2)), Rotuman (s.28(3)-(4)) and Banaban (s.28(5)-(6)) peoples — one of the most fundamental and entrenched provisions in Fiji's constitutional history. Approximately 87 per cent of Fiji's land is iTaukei land, managed by the iTaukei Land Trust Board. The prohibition on permanent alienation is absolute — only the State may acquire customary land, and only in accordance with the compensation provisions in s.27. The FPR's coverage of the Vuda incinerator proposal illustrates s.28 in practice — any lease of iTaukei land requires TLTB approval, and a purported lease without that approval is null and void under established law.
iTaukei landRotuman landBanaban landPermanent alienation prohibitedTLTB
"All minerals in or under any land or water, are owned by the State, provided however, that the owners of any particular land (whether customary or freehold)...shall be entitled to receive a fair share of royalties or other money paid to the State in respect of the grant by the State of rights to extract minerals from that land or the seabed in the area of those fishing rights."
FPR Analysis
Section 30 vests all mineral ownership in the State — but importantly guarantees that landowners, whether customary or freehold, are entitled to a fair share of royalties when the State grants mineral extraction rights over their land. The section's title reflects this nuance: it is a royalty-sharing provision as much as an ownership provision. The Chair of the iTaukei Lands and Fisheries Commission, Ratu Meli Saubulinayau, has submitted to the CRC that s.30 should be amended to recognise iTaukei mineral ownership rather than State ownership with royalty-sharing rights — arguing the current framework reflects a colonial legacy predating 1874.
MineralsState ownershipRoyalty entitlementRatu Meli Saubulinayau
CRC Watch
Any amendment to s.30 requires careful analysis of fiscal implications, existing royalty frameworks and investor confidence. The Commission must engage seriously with Ratu Meli Saubulinayau's submission as the submission of a constitutional office holder representing iTaukei land interests."Every person has the right to — early childhood education; primary and secondary education; and further education. The State must take reasonable measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to free early childhood, primary, secondary and further education. If the State claims that it does not have the resources to implement the right, it is the responsibility of the State to show that the resources are not available."
FPR Analysis
Section 31 establishes the right to education under a progressive realisation framework. The burden-of-proof reversal in s.31(5) is significant — if the State claims insufficient resources, it must demonstrate this. Section 31 is one of Fiji's socioeconomic rights provisions (ss.31-40) that the CRC's own submissions have noted lack a monitoring mechanism. The Commission should consider extending the Human Rights Commission's mandate to include periodic reporting on progressive realisation of these rights.
Right to educationProgressive realisationReversed burden of proof
"The Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission is responsible for promoting the protection and observance of, and respect for, human rights in public and private institutions, and to develop a culture of human rights in Fiji. The Commission consists of a chairperson, who must be a person who is or is qualified to be appointed as a judge, and 4 other members, appointed by the President on the advice of the Constitutional Offices Commission."
FPR Analysis
Section 45 establishes the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission. A critical structural limitation is created by the transitional provisions at s.172(5) of Chapter 12, which prevent the Commission from dealing with complaints relating to events occurring before 21 August 2013. This means the Commission cannot investigate alleged human rights violations from the December 2006 to September 2013 period of military governance. Combined with Chapter 10's immunity provisions, this creates a comprehensive accountability gap for an entire seven-year period. The CRC submissions, including the FPR's own submission to SCFAD, have identified this as a structural concern requiring remedy.
Human rights bodyTemporal restriction s.172(5)2006-2013 accountability gap
CRC Watch
The Commission should recommend that the temporal restriction in s.172(5) be removed or modified to permit the Human Rights Commission to receive and investigate — for truth-finding purposes only, without power to impose liability — complaints relating to the 2006-2013 period. Accountability and criminal liability are distinct. The restriction currently prevents even truth-finding.Chapter 3Parliament
Establishes Fiji's unicameral Parliament, the proportional representation electoral system with 5% threshold, voter qualification and the rules governing membership — including the strict party discipline provisions. Begins at s.46.
"In each general election of members of Parliament, the seats in Parliament must be awarded to candidates in proportion to the total number of votes cast for each political party. A political party or an independent candidate shall not qualify for any seat in Parliament unless the political party or the independent candidate receives at least 5% of the total number of votes cast."
FPR Analysis
Section 53 establishes the open list proportional representation system — eliminating the communal rolls that had defined Fiji's electoral architecture since independence. The 5% national threshold in s.53(3) is among the higher thresholds used in proportional representation systems globally. A party receiving 4.9% of votes receives no representation — which may disproportionately affect minority or regionally concentrated communities, creating tension with s.26's equality protections. The Fiji Electoral Law Reform Commission examined these provisions in depth in its July 2025 report — which has been with the Acting Attorney-General since 8 July 2025 and has not been tabled in Parliament. The CRC cannot credibly review s.53 without access to that report.
Proportional representationOpen list5% thresholdNon-communal rollsFELRC
CRC Watch
The Commission should formally request the Acting Attorney-General provide the FELRC report before finalising any recommendations on s.53. Reviewing Fiji's electoral system without access to the body of analysis specifically commissioned by Parliament for that purpose would be a serious analytical failure."A member of Parliament vacates his or her seat in Parliament if the member — resigns from the political party for which he or she was a candidate at the time of election to Parliament; votes or abstains from voting in Parliament contrary to any direction issued by the political party for which he or she was a candidate at the time of election, without obtaining the prior permission of the political party; or is expelled from the political party."
FPR Analysis
Section 63(1)(g)-(i) creates automatic seat vacation for any MP who votes against their party's direction — one of the most rigid party discipline provisions in any Commonwealth constitution. An MP who votes against their party on any matter, including a matter of conscience affecting fundamental rights, loses their seat without any discretion available to the courts. This transforms elected members from representatives of constituents into delegates of party leadership. The provision structurally conflicts with the principle of free legislative mandate recognised in international parliamentary standards, and with the right to hold elected office if elected (s.23(3)(d)). The CRC's own submissions, including the FPR's analysis, have identified this as a key structural concern.
Party disciplineConscience voteParliamentary independenceFree mandate
CRC Watch
The Commission should at minimum recommend conscience vote protections for defined categories of legislation touching fundamental rights under Chapter 2. A provision requiring automatic seat vacation for voting against any party direction — including on human rights matters — is incompatible with genuine parliamentary representation of constituents.Chapter 4The Executive
Establishes the President (s.81), Prime Minister, Cabinet, Attorney-General (s.96) and Director of Public Prosecutions (s.107). The concentration of executive authority — combined with s.63 party discipline — creates a structural imbalance the CRC must address.
"The executive authority of the State is vested in the Cabinet, which is collectively responsible to Parliament for the exercise of executive authority."
FPR Analysis
Section 91 vests executive authority in Cabinet. Combined with the strict party discipline of s.63, a Prime Minister commanding a parliamentary majority faces few effective constitutional constraints. Regan, Kirkby and Kant (Journal of Pacific History, 2024) describe the resulting structure as creating a "winner-takes-all government system" in which powers are "constrained mainly by the Republic of Fiji Military Forces." The Prime Minister controls ministerial appointments (s.92), parliamentary dissolution on advice (s.58), and the election writ (s.59). The combination of these powers with s.63's effective control over MPs' voting behaviour gives the executive an extraordinary concentration of authority that the Commission must examine.
Executive powerCabinet authorityWinner-takes-allConcentration of power
CRC Watch
The Commission must assess whether adequate checks on executive power exist — including independent parliamentary committees with genuine investigative powers, minimum dissolution periods, and whether the combination of s.91 and s.63 produces a system compatible with the democratic values declared in s.1."The President is appointed by the Constitutional Offices Commission for a term of 3 years and is eligible for re-appointment for one further term. A person is not eligible for appointment as President unless the person is a citizen of Fiji and has been ordinarily resident in Fiji for at least 3 years immediately before the appointment."
FPR Analysis
Section 86 vests the appointment of the President in the Constitutional Offices Commission — removing the appointment power that the Great Council of Chiefs held under the 1997 Constitution. Under the 1997 Constitution the GCC appointed the President — a significant source of chiefly constitutional authority. The 2013 Constitution's removal of that role was one of the GCC's major grievances with the Bainimarama government's constitutional settlement, compounded by Bainimarama's dissolution of the GCC in 2012. The GCC has now been reinstated under the current government and has submitted to the CRC that its presidential appointment role be restored.
Presidential appointmentConstitutional Offices CommissionGCC proposal1997 Constitution
CRC Watch
The GCC has submitted to the CRC that it be restored to its pre-2013 role of appointing the President of Fiji. Any amendment to s.86 to restore this role would require a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority and simple majority referendum approval. The Commission must consider whether restoring a hereditary chiefly institution's power to appoint the head of state is compatible with the democratic and equality values declared in s.1 and s.5 — and what accountability mechanisms would apply to a GCC appointment process. The Commission cannot endorse the proposal without addressing these constitutional tensions directly.Chapter 5The Judiciary
Establishes Fiji's courts and the independence framework for judicial officers. The composition of the Judicial Services Commission (s.104) and the independence it provides — or does not provide — is a structural question for the CRC.
"The courts and all judicial officers are independent of the legislative and executive branches of Government, and are subject only to this Constitution and the law, which they must apply without fear, favour or prejudice. No person may interfere with the judicial functioning of a court or judicial officer."
FPR Analysis
Section 97 guarantees judicial independence in clear and unambiguous terms. The Supreme Court demonstrated meaningful independence in its August 2025 advisory opinion, reading down the constitutional amendment threshold in the face of executive preferences for a different interpretation. The independence declared in s.97 is only as durable as the appointment process that determines who sits on the bench — making the composition of the Judicial Services Commission in s.104 a structural concern that the CRC must examine in light of the principles s.97 declares.
Judicial independenceRule of lawNo interferenceSupreme Court 2025
"The Judicial Services Commission consists of — (a) the Chief Justice, who is to be the chairperson; (b) the President of the Court of Appeal; (c) the Permanent Secretary responsible for justice; and (d) a legal practitioner appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Justice following consultation by the Chief Justice with the Attorney-General."
FPR Analysis
Section 104 establishes the Judicial Services Commission. The Attorney-General is not a member of the JSC — but the Chief Justice must consult the AG when advising on the appointment of the lay legal practitioner member (s.104(1)(d)). The more significant structural concern is the presence of the Permanent Secretary responsible for justice — a public servant directly employed by the executive — as a full JSC member. International standards for judicial independence, including the Bangalore Principles and the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles, recommend that judicial appointment bodies be free from direct executive influence. A public servant accountable to a minister sitting on the body that recommends judicial appointments is inconsistent with those standards.
Judicial appointmentsJSC compositionPermanent SecretaryIndependence standards
CRC Watch
The Commission should consider whether the Permanent Secretary's membership of the JSC is compatible with the independence standard declared in s.97 — and whether replacing that position with a representative elected by the independent legal profession would better serve the principle of judicial independence.Chapter 6Security Services
Establishes the constitutional mandate of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces at s.131 — the provision that most distinguishes the 2013 Constitution from conventional democratic constitutions.
"It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians."
FPR Analysis
Section 131(2) gives the RFMF a constitutional mandate extending beyond conventional defence to include the "well-being" of Fiji and all Fijians — a phrase undefined in the Constitution and broad enough to be construed to justify military involvement in civilian governance. In the context of Fiji's coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006, this broad mandate carries heightened interpretive risk. Section 2(6) prohibits establishing government otherwise than in accordance with the Constitution, but s.131(2)'s open-textured mandate creates structural tension with this prohibition. Regan, Kirkby and Kant (Journal of Pacific History, 2024) describe the RFMF as maintaining an "extra-constitutional and expansive role" under this provision as the self-appointed "protector" of the Fijian people and the Constitution.
RFMF mandateWell-being clauseCivilian oversightCoup history
CRC Watch
The Commission must recommend amending s.131(2) to confine the RFMF's mandate to external defence and security assistance to civil authorities at the request of, and under the authority of, the elected civilian government. Removing "well-being" is essential to closing the constitutional gap that has historically enabled military justification for intervention in democratic governance.Chapter 10Immunity
Grants permanent immunity from legal proceedings for acts committed between December 2006 and the first sitting of Parliament after the 2013 Constitution commenced. Chapter 10 cannot be amended or reviewed by any parliamentary process or court challenge.
"Absolute and unconditional immunity is irrevocably granted to any person (whether in their official or personal or individual capacity) holding the office of — the President; the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers; Republic of Fiji Military Forces; Fiji Police Force; Fiji Corrections Service; Judiciary; public service; and any public office — from any criminal prosecution and from any civil or other liability in any court, tribunal or commission, as a result of any direct or indirect participation, appointment or involvement in the Government from 5 December 2006 to the date of the first sitting of the first Parliament elected after the commencement of this Constitution."
FPR Analysis
Section 157 grants blanket immunity from all criminal and civil proceedings for official acts committed between the December 2006 coup and the first sitting of Parliament after the 2013 Constitution. Combined with s.155 (continuing 1990 Constitution immunities) and s.156 (continuing the Limitation of Liability for Prescribed Political Events Decree 2010), Chapter 10 creates a comprehensive accountability shield covering the entire period of military governance. The class of beneficiaries is extraordinarily broad — encompassing the President, Cabinet, RFMF, Police, Corrections Service, Judiciary and public service. The only carve-out is for specific criminal offences under the Crimes Decree 2009 listed in the proviso to s.157.
Coup immunity2006-2013 periodAbsolute immunityBroad class of beneficiaries
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, this Chapter and any immunity granted or continued in this Chapter shall not be reviewed, amended, altered, repealed or revoked. No court or tribunal shall have the jurisdiction to accept, hear or make any decision or order with respect to any challenge against the provisions of this Chapter and any immunity granted or continued in this Chapter."
FPR Analysis
Section 158 entrenches Chapter 10 beyond the reach of any amendment process. Section 159(2) — the amendment procedure in Chapter 11 — explicitly prohibits any amendment that would "repeal any provision in Chapter 10" or "infringe or diminish the effect of any provision in Chapter 10." This means the immunity provisions are constitutionally permanent: no parliamentary supermajority, no referendum, can remove them. The courts are also expressly stripped of jurisdiction to challenge Chapter 10. The only path through which these provisions could be changed is the adoption of an entirely new constitution — not an amendment of the existing document.
UnamendableCourt jurisdiction ousteds.159(2) exclusionNew constitution only
Note on constitutional permanence: Chapter 10 is the only chapter of the 2013 Constitution that is explicitly and permanently excluded from the amendment process. Even the three-quarters parliamentary supermajority plus referendum approval established in s.160 cannot reach Chapter 10. This is the clearest instance of unamendability in the Constitution — and the most significant structural constraint facing the CRC.
CRC Watch
The Commission cannot recommend amendment of Chapter 10 through the ordinary process in Chapter 11 - because s.158 and s.159(2) exclude Chapter 10 from that process entirely. However the Commission can recommend removing the unamendability clause in s.158 itself - which, if adopted, would restore the amendability of Chapter 10 through the standard Chapter 11 procedure. Courts should then retain jurisdiction to assess whether specific conduct falls within or outside the scope of immunity - without requiring retrospective prosecution. This is the pathway that restores the constitutional integrity of judicial oversight without mandating criminal liability for those who received immunity.Chapter 11Amendment of the Constitution
Governs how the Constitution may be amended. The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of 29 August 2025 changed the amendment landscape fundamentally — making constitutional reform more achievable than at any point since 2013.
"A Bill for the amendment of this Constitution must be passed by Parliament — read 3 times; supported at the second and third readings by the votes of at least three-quarters of the members of Parliament; with an interval of at least 30 days between the second and third readings; and after the relevant committee has reported. If the referendum outcome is that three-quarters of the total number of registered voters have voted in favour, the President must assent."
FPR Analysis
Section 160 originally required a three-quarters majority of all registered voters in a referendum — a threshold that made constitutional amendment functionally impossible given Fiji's voter turnout history. Constitutional scholars described this as "functional unamendability." The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of 29 August 2025 ([2025] FJSC 20; Miscellaneous 1 of 2025) read down s.160(6), ruling that a two-thirds parliamentary majority combined with a simple majority of votes cast in a referendum is sufficient. This decision is the legal foundation for the CRC's entire work. However, the three-quarters parliamentary supermajority requirement at second and third readings remains unchanged — demanding cross-party consensus. The 30-day interval between readings also remains. And Chapter 10 remains completely beyond the reach of s.160, regardless of how many votes any amendment bill receives.
Amendment procedureSupreme Court 2025Three-quarters majorityReferendumFunctional unamendability
CRC Watch
The August 2025 advisory opinion ([2025] FJSC 20; Miscellaneous 1 of 2025) partially addressed the functional unamendability concern by reading down the referendum threshold — but the three-quarters parliamentary supermajority and the unamendability of ss.159-160 themselves remain unaddressed. The Commission should recommend: replacing "three-quarters of total registered voters" with "three-quarters of valid votes cast" in s.160(6), provided a minimum turnout threshold of 50% of registered voters is also met; and reviewing whether the complete unamendability of ss.159-160 is necessary, or whether a higher threshold — such as a four-year delay plus two-thirds approval — would be a constitutionally safer alternative.